a) Consider a game in strategic form, G. Define a strictly dominated strategy. Suppose that player i has a strictly dominated strategy s;. Explain why s; cannot be played in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game G. Explain also why s; cannot be played with positive probability in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G. b) Consider the game with payoffs as depicted in the table below. Player 1 is the row player and her payoff is written first in every cell, and player 2 is the column player. C R L 0,4 1,2 0,0 T M 3,7 2,1 1,5 B 0,3 6.2 8,4 Eliminate the strictly dominated strategies for each player. Solve for all the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Solve for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where each player randomizes between two of his pure strategies.