Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage. Firm 1 chooses quantity 41. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose q2 and q3, respectively. Market demand is given by p(q) = 100 - Q and Q = 91 +92 +93. Firm 1's costs are cı(91) = 691. firm 2's costs are c2(22) = 1q2 and firm 3's costs are c3(93) = 193. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of qı and q3, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q1 and 22. Using these answer the following questions. a) If Firm 1 chooses qı = 3, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) If Firm 1 chooses q1 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity?