Suppose an industry with three firms 1) having the same constant marginal cost c₁ = C₂ = C3 = 2; 2) incurring no fixed cost of production; 3) producing a homogeneous good and choosing output simultaneously (i.e., being Cournot competitors); and 4) facing the linear inverse demand P = 10-Q with Q=q₁ +92 +93. Assume firm 1 merges with firm 3 and retains the name firm 1. The two remaining firms, 1 and 2, continue to compete in quantity. Although firm 2's marginal cost remains at C₂ = 2 post-merger, the new firm's marginal cost becomes c₁ = 1 post- merger. . Q6) Determine firm 1's quantity at the post-merger equilibrium. Q7) The merger is A) Profitable B) Not profitable • Q8) The merger leads to A) A price increase - B) A price decrease