There were two computer firms in the late 1960s, one a giant (IBM), the other an upstart (Telex), who were battling for market share and profits. Telex was making inroads into IBMs market share by creating almost perfect substitutes for IBMs harware. Telex products, such as computer printers and memories, were plug compatible, which meant they could be plugged right into an IBM machine and work fine. Call player 1 Telex, and player 2, IBM. Telex moves first. Telex can either enter IBMs market or stay out. If Telex stays out, it earns a normal profit somewhere else in the economy (payoff = 1) and IBM makes monopoly profits in its market (payoff = 5). If Telex enter IBM's market, then IBM has to move. IBM can accommodate Telex by letting it into the market without a fight. Or IBM can smash Telex, slashing prices to the bone so that both companies are making no profit. The term smash for this strategy comes from an internal IBM memorandum of the period, entitled Operation Smash, which outlined precisely this response to Telexs entry attempt. If IBM accommodates Telexs entry, then they each get the payoff of 2. If IBM smashes Telex, then they each get the payoff 0. After either of these moves by IBM the game ends a. Draw the tree diagram to fully represent the above game b. Write down the set of strategies for Telex. c. Write down the set of strategies for IBM. d. What is the equilibrium pair of strategies for Telex and IBM? e. What are the equilibrium payoffs for the two companies?